ENDNOTES.

[1] 42 U.S.C. 3604(a), 3604(b).

[2] 42 U.S.C. 3605.

[3] E.g., Old West End Ass'n v. Buckeye Federal S&L, 675 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ohio 1987; Laufman v. Oakley Building & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 498 (S.D. Ohio 1976).

[4] 12 C.F.R. 531.8(d).

[5] 42 U.S.C. 3605.

[6] United States of America v. Decatur Federal Savings and Loan Association, No. 92-CV-2198 (N.D. Georgia, Sept. 17 1992), Complaint.

[7] United States of America v. Decatur Federal Savings and Loan Association, No. 92-CV-2198 (N.D. Georgia, Sept. 17 1992), Consent Decree, at 2.

[8] Remarks of Richard J. Ritter, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Home Mortgage Lending & Discrimination: Research and Enforcement Conference, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, DC, May 18, 1993.

[9] 42 U.S.C. 3614(a).

[10] See, e.g., the hearings on mortgage lending discrimination held by the Banking, Currency, and Housing Committee of the U.S. Senate on February, 24, 1993.

[11] As used in this report, the term "primary Fair Lending enforcement agency" reflects the de facto allocation of the responsibility for administrative enforcement of the Fair Lending laws that has taken place among the many federal agencies with de jure responsibility for enforcing the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The Fair Housing Act designates HUD as the lead federal agency for administrative enforcement of its provisions with respect to all types of mortgage lending institutions, and grants the broad prosecutorial authority to the Justice Department. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act allocates the responsibility for administrative enforcement of its provisions with respect to depository institutions among the various federal banking agencies, and assigns this responsibility to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in with respect to most non-depository institutions. The federal banking agencies conduct regular Fair Lending examinations of the depository institutions, and thus are viewed in this report as the primary enforcement agencies for such mortgage lenders. HUD, not the FTC, is viewed in this report as the primary enforcement agency for non-depository mortgage lenders. This judgment reflects a number of factors. As indicated, HUD has broad administrative enforcement responsibilities under the Fair Housing Act with respect to all mortgage lenders. The FTC has no special mandate in the housing or housing finance area and lacks the administrative resources for any major Fair Lending enforcement program. The nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies (as non-depository institutions) are not subject to the direct Fair Lending enforcement authority of the federal banking agencies. Thus, HUD is viewed in this report as the primary enforcement agency for such mortgage lenders.

[12] Complaint, supra note 6, at 6-7.

[13] Complaint, supra note 6, at 5-6.

[14] More precisely, Table 3 provides data on application origination rates, rather than application approval rates. The application "approval" rates shown in the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th data columns of Table 3 indicate the percentage of home purchase loan applications that resulted in loan originations, not loan approvals. This distinction arises because a limited number of loans are approved by the lender but not accepted by the borrower. For example, of the aggregate total of 623,676 home purchase loan applications with no FRB edit flag in the 16 metro areas in 1991, only 2.65 percent were approved by the lender but not accepted by the applicant.

[15] Complaint, supra note 6, at 4.

[16] In constructing HMDA data files for this study, the Banking Research Project defined low and moderate income borrowers as persons whose income was less than 80% of the metro area median family income. Borrower income is one of the data items reported in HMDA application records. A borrower's reported income was compared to the 1989 median family income for the appropriate metro area.

[17] Robert G. Schwemm, Housing Discrimination: Law and Litigation, Clark, Boardman, Callaghan, Deerfield, Illinois, 1992, at 10-24, 10-25.

[18] U.S. Senate, Senate Report No. 94-589 (Banking, Currency and Housing Committee), January 21, 1976, at 4-5. In 1989, an increasingly conservative U.S. Supreme Court sought to emasculate the effects test standard enunciated for employment discrimination cases in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. by dramatically reducing the burden of proof required to establish a business necessity defense. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). However, Congress responded by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which reestablished the effects test standard of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. U.S. Congress, Public Law 102-166 (1991).

[19] See, e.g., Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates, 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422U.S. 1042 (1975).

[20] Schwemm, supra note 17, at 10-22.

[21] 42 U.S.C. 3614a.

[22] Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).

[23] Validity or quality flags are used by the FRB to indicate there are concerns about the accuracy of the data in the record.